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1,1-fE PRESIDENT’S Council of Economic Advises’s
forecasts 1967 gross national product at $787 billion
in current prices, an increase of about 6.5 per cent
over 1966. This increase consists of an advance of
~ nearly 4 per cent in real output and an increase ol
slightly more than 2.5 per cent in prices.
The Council’s forecast, or plan, is constructed in
large measure on a Federal budget progratn that pro-
duces in calendar 1967 about a $4 billion deficit on a
national income accous~stsbasis.v A 14.3 per cent in- crease in Federal spending and an 11.3 per cent rise
in revenues underlie this projected deficit. The cx-
E
pected increase in revenues will result from several
factors, including continued advance in total income
and a proposed 6 per cent surcharge on personal and
corporate income taxes effective July 1.
The Federal budget program and the Annual Re-
port of the Council of Economnic Advisers (CEA)
together can he viewed as a national economic plan in the spirit of the Employment Act of 1946. The pres-
entation of the CEA is based, in considerable meas-
E ure, on the popular theory that Federal budget policy to a major degree can control total demand and thereby exert a primnary influence on changes in
real output and prices. Budget policy is presumably
f designed to achieve an optimum level of demand
patible with the goals of high employment, real growth,
relative price stability, and equilibrium in the nation’s
balance of payments.
In contrast with the fiscal policy theory of eco-
nomic stabilization there is an alternative school of
r thought which places primary emphasis on control of
L monetar variables as a vehicle for influencing total
mAnunal Report of the Council of Ecoaonsic Adcisers (January
1967), PP. 62-63.
tmThe national income accounts budget sumsrsarizes the receipts
and expenditures of the Federal Government sector as an
integrated
part of the recorded activities of all sectors of tIme
economy. For expanded discussion of this and other fiscal
measures, see the appendix, ‘Budget Concepts and Definitions,”
p. 11.
spending. It is the belief of this school that monetary
factois play a dominant role in the determination of
total demand.3
The theory implicit in tile following presentation
is that the combination of stabilization policies, rather
than fiscal or monetary policy-alone, in large part
determines total demand. Consequently, this dis-
cussion of the Federal budget alludes frequently to
the role of monetary policy in national economic devel-
opments. The purpose of this article is to summarize
the proposed Federal budget program for calendar
1967 and to examnme its implications as a part of total
stabilization ~~1m>’.
Although the Federal budget receives considerable
attention at this particular time of year, it seems
that in the interest of a dynamic and effective sta-
bilization policy, or even of a neutral policy, the
budget program should be revie\ved continuously
throughout the year. Evaluations are made privately
on a continuous basis, but an official midyear budget
review (with revised projections) was not released to
the public in 1966. To assure a free and fully-informed
discussion and interchange of ideas both inside and
outside of Government, it would be desirable to have
official revised projections frequently, possibly on a
quarterly basis,4 A midyear review in July or August
after Congress has made most of its decisions would
seem more reliable for the ensuing year than the 12-
month forecast made in January. The CEA Report
focuses primarily on the immediate 12 months, while
tm
The 1967 Report pays considerable Isomage to the role that
monetary pcslicy played in restraining total demand in 1966.
The appearance of such an ackisowledgment distimsguishes tise
2967 Report from previous ones, in which monetary policy
was seemingly considered supportive (for fiscal policy) rather
than active in affecting total demand.
4A similar recommendation has recently been made by the
Joint Economic Committee of Congress, Although revised
budget projections are not made available, data on realized
expessclitsires and revenues are readily available. See, e.g., time
Survey of Current Business. For a brief quarterly analysis of
these data, see “Federal Budget Trends,” a release of the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Page 5the Budget concentrates on the 12-month period be-
ginning next July 1. ~
To form a basis for a discussion of budget policy
in future months, this article summarizes and evaluates
economic developments, budget conditions, and mon-
etary developments in calendar 1966. The budget
program through June 1968 is thems summarized and
analyzed within a framework emphasizing total sta-
bilization policy. An appendix is provided that dis-
cusses alternative budget sneasures.
Budget Policy and Economic and
Monetary Conditions in 1966
Real economic activity advanced rapidly in 1966,
hut advances were constrained by the size of the labor
force and limnitations on plant capacity. Employment,
production, and income all increased, though less
rapidly than in 1965 when some economic slack re-
mained.°As a result of total demand pressing on
available resources, prices rose significantly, par-
ticularly early in the year. In an attempt to limit
excessive total demand and price increases, mone-
tary expansion was restricted beginning in the spring.
Intense demands for credit produced rising interest
rates early in the year, while limitations on credit ex-
pansion accelerated the rise during the summer.
The Federal budget, on balance, was a strong force
underlying the buoyant economic situation in 1966.
Government expenditures grew rapidly as spending
for defense and health, education, and welfare pro-
grams rose sharply. Federal revenues also increased
rapidly, partly in response to rising money incomes
but also in some measure because of increases in tax
rates.
Resource Transfers in 1966
Total income and output showed advances sub-
stantial enough to keep the economy at high employ-
ment during 1966. Real output (GNP in constant
dollars) rose 4.1 per cent in the year ended in the
fourth quarter of 1966, with the advance most rapid
in the first quarter.
The year 1966 was marked by the necessity to
allocate resources to military use more rapidly than
total available resources were growing. Such a trans-
fer of resources is facilitated if there is a considerable
quantity of unused resources in the economy, as was
the case at the outbreak of the Korean conflict. The
Vietnam war was escalated at a time when there was
very little slack in the economy.
At times of high employment and near-capacity
levels of output, a resource transfer from civilian use
to military use is normally effected by either tax in-
creases or a system of Government controls, Neither
route was followed with respect to the Vietnam build-
up in late 1965 and 1966. Instead, the price mechanism
was utilized to effect the resource transfer, i.e, the
Federal Government bid away goods and services from
civilian use for the war effort.
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Nource: U. 5. Depsrtrnent of commerce.
Overall price increases thus operated as a silent tax
in the absence of more restrictive fiscal or monetary
actions. The growth of real after-tax personal income
slowed as prices rose faster relative to money incomes
than previously. Associated witls the slowdown in the
growth of real spendable income was a decline in real
demand for civilian goods, in particular for auto-
mobiles and housing.
In response to excessive dollar demand for goods
and services, and thereby for loan funds, and to some
extent to restriction on monetary expansion beginning
in the spring of 1966, interest rates rose. This in-
crease in the price of credit helped to effect the
transfer of resources by discouraging demand for










































Since there is some evidence to support the view that the
budget affects economic activity with some lag, see, e.g., Albert
Ando and E. Cary Brown, “Lags in Fiscal Policy,” Stabilization
Policies, Research Studies prepared for the Commission on
Money and Credit (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1963), it would seem that the budget for fiscal 1968
(year ending June 30, 1968) must afford a basis for an eco-
nomic plan for a year beginning in, say, October 1967 or
January 1968. If the primary concern of the Economic Report
is the state of the economy in calendar 1967, it would seem
that the budget for the year ending June 30, 1967, is more
relevant than the budget for the year ending June 30, 1968.
an extended discussion of economic developments in 1966,




Source, U.S. Deportment of Commerce
Shaded areas represent periods of business recession as defined by the
National Bureau al Economic Research.
Latest data plotted, 4th quarter preliminary
elements of total cost, e.g., housing and commercial
and industrial buildings.
The resultant rise in interest rates affected housing
more than if the resource transfer had been effected
by taxes. Housing probably would have been affected if incomes had been reduced by tax increases, but the
extent would probably have been less. Interest rates
would not have risen so rapidly, and the cost of new housing services would not have increased as much if
a more restrictive course of fiscal action had been
followed.
Any transfer of resources in a high-employment
economy involves a cost, and some groups gain at the
expense of others. However, transfer by tax increases permits the effects to be planned and regulated while maintaining the advantages of free markets. The price
inflation mechanism causes inequities that are often r unpredictable and creates distortions that may be in
i~ conflict with national goals of efficient resource al-
location and equilibrium in the balance of payments.
Stabilization Policy in 1966
The fiscal actions that were supposed to restrain
I demand in 1966—social security tax increases, speed- up in the collection of individual and corporate in-
come taxes, and rescission of scheduled
excise tax cuts—came too late to thwart
the inflationary pressures of the first
quarter.7 In fact, there is some question
whether the 1966 first quarter experience
could have been avoided (or offset) by
700 budget actions as late as January and
February of that year. Because of lags
600 in the effect of stabilization policies, the
stage may have been set for an inflation-
ary period by a very stimulative fiscal
500 situation in late 1965 supplesnented by
rapid snonetary expansion in late 1965
and early 1966. The Vietnam buildup in
the last half of 1965 ~va~accompanied by
400 excise tax reductions and a large retro-
active increase in social security benefits.
The money stock expanded at a 6 per
cent annual rate from April 1965 to April
300 1966. Other key monetary variables, such
as commercial bank credit and member
bank reserves, also increased very rapid-
ly during the year ending in April 1966.
This combination of monetary and fiscal
forces may havebeen sufficient to cause
the first quarter 1966 excesses and the
carryover with respect to prices in the
second quarter (even though the advance
of GNP slowed substantially in that quarter).
The restrictive budget measures that were effected
—increased social security taxes, accelerated tax col-
lections, and rescinded excise taxes—may have helped
to slow the economy after the unsustainable advance
in the last half of 1965 and the first quarter of 1966.
These fiscal actions represented restraining factors in
addition to the April turnaround in monetary growth
and the implicit tax increase through inflation. Al-
though Government expenditures rose substantially
in the first half of 1966, these increases were more
than offset by the increase in tax revenues, and the
national income accounts (NIA) budget sho’sved a
surplus of $3.1 billion compared with a $1.4 billion
deficit in the last half of 1965.
During the second half of 1966 Federal expenditure
increases outpaced the growth in receipts, resulting
in a $2.7 billion deficit in the NIA budget. Expendi-
tures for the Vietnam war continued to rise, and some
~Nnrmally a change in collection procedures is not viewed a
restrictive action because individuals and firms supposedly re-
act to changes in liabilities rather than collections. The speed-
up is mentioned here, however, because the 1966 CEA Report
listed this action as restrictive in its effect on total demand.
See pp. 53-54.
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Page 7domestic nondefense expenditures
also rose, particularly those related
to the medicare program. No direct
tax increases became effective in the
second half, although in October the
investment tax credit was rescinded
and depreciation allowances for tax
purposes were tightened. Thesemeas-
ures probably had little effect on tax
revenues in 1966, although they may
have affected total demand via in-
vestment decisions.
For the year 1966 the NIA budget
ran a small $0.2 billion surplus, and
since the economy was at full em-
ployment the high-employment
budget showed the same result.8 On
this high-employment basis, this
small budget surplus in 1966 indi-
cated the most stisnulative budget in
more than a decade. The high-
employment budget ran about an
$8 billion average surplus from 1961 to 1965.
The stimulative budget situation in 1966 was ac-
companied by very restrictive monetary actions after
April. The money stock showed little change from then
to late fall. With loan demand fueled by rapid growth
in total demand for goods and services, interest rates
rose rapidly until September.
t
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Budget Program for Fiscal 1967-68
The economic outlook for 1967 depends in large
measure on the course of recent, present, and future
monetary and fiscal developments. Such developments
in turn are influenced by the unfolding of economic
events. A forecast of economic conditions and policy
must take into account this simultaneity. Presumably
the Council’s forecast is based on this simultaneous
interaction. This section discusses in some detail the
budget program for the 18-month period
ending June 30, 1968 and examines budg-
et policy in light of expected economic
and monetary conditions.
185 The Budget Program:
180 A Factual Summary
175 Budget plans for the next 18 months
170 indicate a larger average deficit than in
calendar 1966. This conclusion obtains
165 for the national income accounts budget,
160 considered to be the most complete and
reliable measure of the Federal Govern-
155 ment’s activities and their economic
impact.
150
The following summary of the fiscal
1 45 program for the remainder of fiscal 1967
and fiscal 1968 is presented as general
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Page 8budget. Fiscal year figures are
given because the budget document
is presented on that basis.
New Obligational Authority.
bligational authority on a cash budget basis, i.e., authority pro- vided by Congress to obligate the
Federal Government to pay out
oney, increases to an estimated $194.2 billion in fiscal 1968 frosn
$190.4 billion in fiscal 1967. This
r fiscal measure is considered by some to be a key variable in any analysis of the Federal budget.9
The reason for this is that expendi- [ tures must be preceded by granting
of obligational authority by Con-
gress.
The $3.8 billion increase in obli- gational authority planned for fiscal
1968 compares \vith an increase of
27.3 billion in the previous fiscal year. Last year’s January budget
plan (i.e., for fiscal 1967) called for
a $3.5 billion increase in new obli- gational authority. These plans went awry, partly because of sup-
plemental appropriations requested
n January 1967 for Vietnam, but also because of larger-than-expec-




Expenditures. Federal NIA [ penditures in fiscal 1968 are esti-
mated to increase 10.2 per cent over
fiscal 1967, which in turn is expec-
ed
to be 16.1 per cent above fiscal
1966. Fiscal 1967 expenditures are
estimated at $153.6 billion, 7.6 per
cent above the figure projected a
year ago for the fiscal 1967 period.
Fiscal 1968 expenditures include
increases over presently estimated
1967 expenditures of $5.8 billion or
8.5 per cent for defense and $9.8
billion or 11.5 per cent for non-
defense spending including expand-
CHANGES IN OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY
Cash Budget
2,0
Fiscal 1966 to Fiscal 1967 Fiscal 1967 to Fiscal 1968
Billions of Billions of
Dollars Per Cent Dollars Per Cent
Defense 8.6 ¶2.5 2.2 2.8
International and space —l - —10,1 0.3 3.1
Domestic 19.8 23,7 1.3 1.3





portation 6,6 36.1 —3,0 —12.1
Interest on public debt 1.4 11.6 0,7 5.2
Other’ 1.1 7.7 —0.2 —1.3
Total 27,3 16,7 3.B
*Agric,slsnrc-, veterans’ benefits asscl services, general govern,,,:” it, civilian and military pay increanen,
Source: The Budge! of the Unie,’d State., C oven-nncr F for the hitca / Year Ending /tine 30, F 968, p. 44,
Fiscal ¶967 to Fiscal ¶968
Defense
International and space —
Domestic






Interest on public debt
Other’ 1.8 14.3
15.6 ¶0.2
*Agriculture veterans’ benefits and services, general governsnent, civilian and military pay increases.
Source: The Budget of the United States Government for the FiscaL Year Ending Jane 30, /968, p. 43.
CHANGES IN FEDERAL SPENDING
National Income Accounts Budget

































CHANGES IN FEDERAL RECEIPTS
National Income Accounts Budget
Fiscal 1966 to Fiscal 1967 Fiscal 1967 to Fiscal 1968
Billions of Per Cent of Billions of Per Cent of
Dollars 1966 Receipts Dollars 1967 Receipts
Changes due to changes in tax law 7.0 5.3 5.8 3.9
Personol income 1.2 0.9 3.4 2.2
Corporate income —— 1.9 1.3
Excise and other —— —.5 —0.3
Social security 5,8 4.4 1.0 0.7
Changes due to growth in economy 10.2 7.7 11.5 7.7
Total 17.2 33.0 17,3 11.6
Source; Entimated by Federal Reserve Bank of 5t, Louis from The Budget of the United Stotet
Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, sg6s.
ed social security benefits. The increases in fiscal 1967
over fiscal 1966 are 20.9 per cent for defense and
9
See the writings of Murray L. Weidenbaum, e.g., “The Timing
of the Economic Impact of Government Spending,” National
Tax Journal (March 1959), pp. 79-85.
12.5 per cent for nondefense programs.
Receipts. Federal NIA receipts are expected to rise
less rapidly than expenditures from fiscal 1967 to
fiscal 1968, thereby increasing the deficit. Increases in
receipts were large in fiscal 1966 and even larger in
Page 9-40
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Percentages are annual rates of changebetween periods indicated,
l.atestdoto plotted~1967 and firsthalfl96Bestimated byFederal Reserve
Fiscall9ôBBudget,
fiscal 1967. Such increases have resulted primarily be-
cause this was a period of rapidly expanding money
incomes and inflation. Receipts were also accelerated,
however, by faster collections and increases in social
security tax rates during this period.
NIA receipts are anticipated to increase by $17.3
billion or 11.6 per cent in fiscal 1968 over the previous
fiscal year. Growth in receipts will result mainly from
continued economic expansion but will also reflect
the proposed 6 per cent surcharge on personal and
corporate income effective July 1, 1967 and a sched-
uled increase in social security tax rates on January 1,
1968.
Budget Policy in its Economic Setting
Budget plans for calendar 1967 are predicated on a
forecast of sluggish growth in private demand in the
first half of the year with a resumption of Inore rapid
growth in the second half. The purpose of this sec-
tion is to examine Federal bndget plans within the
economic setting expected in calendar 1967.
An evaluation of the Federal budget plan at this
particular time is replete with problems. The Council
of Economic Advisers probably has access to more in-
formation than anyone else at the time of the budget’s
preparation. Consequently, this examination of the
budget centers more on assumptions than on the in-
ternal consistency of the proposed total economic plan.
The economic plan, as presented in the Fiscal 1968
Budget and the CEA Report, is to keep the economy






stability. The budget is pre-
sumably designed to provide
just the right amount of fiscal
stimulus or restraint at the ap-
propriate time. The success of
the proposed budget program
depends on the vagaries of
120 private demand and the re-
sponse of private delnand to
monetary and fiscal actions.
80 Fundamental to success is
whether budget policy is suf-
40 ficiently flexible to move in
accordance with changing ceo-
nomic and monetary conditions.
The budget program for the
40 first half of calendar 1967 is
64 66 1968 essentially determined. Forces
governing the course of expen-
BankofSt,louisfrom ditures and receipts are already
in motion. The CEA indicates
that the sizable stimulus of a $5 billion NIA deficit
will he appropriate in its timing and magnitude of
impact on an economy characterized by weakening
private demand.
Included in the budget program for the second
half of 1967 is a proposed surtax which is supposed to
provide restraint on strengthening private demand at
that time. Such plans provide flexibility in that the
surtax proposal could be dropped if economic condi-
tions do not warrant fiscal restraint. Furthermore, if
inflationary pressures intensify, the surtax rate could
be increased above that which is proposed.
The 1966 experience suggests that budget policy
was not sufficiently flexible to counter movements in
private demand. During the first quarter of 1966,
when it was quite obvious that further monetary or
fiscal restraint was required, budget policy fell short
as an instrument of stabilization. Fiscal restraint was
not forthcoming because of the slow and cumbersome
nature of the budget machinery. It was not possible
to implement a tax increase because of the slowness
of the Congressional process. Furthermore, most Gov-
ernment spending programs are of the type that can-
not be slowed or speeded in accordance with the
desire of the policymaker. Because of the relative
inflexibility of fiscal policy, it was necessary for mon-
etary policy to carry the burden of stabilization in
1966.
Taking these considerations into account, it appears
that monetary policy may again be assigned a critical
role in the total of stabilization policy in 1967. Mone-
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Page 10may cause instability, which is precisely what policy-
makers are trying to avoid.
The economic situation in early 1967 is believed to
dictate a need for more stimulative economic policy.
An indication that the fourth quarter 1966 increase in
GNP contained solne involuntary accumulation of in-
ventory portends further slowing of production and
attempts to reduce inventory. Since fiscal and mone-
tary policies tend to affect total demand with lags,
excessive stisnulation in the next few months might be
too late to avert a slowdown in the first half of 1967
but might create serious inflationary problems in the
second half. On the other hand, insufficient stimula-
tion might cause the slowdown to continue well into
the second half.
KEITH M. CARL5ON
The fiscal activities of the Federal Government can be
summarized in several ways. Some alternative budget con- cepts and the relationships between them are discisssed in
this appendix. A table reconciling these budget concepts
is given, with data for fiscal 1966-68 used for illustration.
Administrative Bridget
The administrative budget is the basic planning docu-
ment of the Federal Government, covering receipts and expenditures of funds that it owns, Its main purpose is to serve as a guide to executive and legislative program plan-
ning, review, and enactment. The administrative budget is
in factthe only Federal “budget” in the sense of a financial
plan. All other ‘tudgets” discussed here are summary
statements of receipts and expenditures classified in various
ways for purposes other than administrative planning.
Those agencies forwhich Congress makes regular appro-
priations are included in the administrative budget. Public
enterprises1 are included while trust funds2 and Govesn-
ment-sponsored agencies~are not.
Expenditures and receipts are generally recorded on a
cash basis, i.e., on the date of actual receipt or payment.
Interest expense is on an accrual basis.
Cash Bridget
The consolidated cash budget is a summary statement
1
Commodity Credit Corporation, Federal National Mortgage
Association, Export-Import Bank, etc.
Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance, Unemployment
Trust Fund, Highway Trust Fund, etc.
2
Federal Home Loan Banks, Federal Land Banks, Federal
Intermediate Credit Banks, and Banks for Cooperatives.
of cash flow between the Federal Government and other
sectors of the economy. Included are activities of the reg-
ular Government agencies found in the administrative budg-
et plus the activities of trust funds and Government-
sponsored agencies. Because activities of some agencies
(e.g., the post office) are recorded on a net basis, the full
magnitude of cash flows between the Federal Government
and other sectors of the economy is not measured by the
cash budget.
The cash surplus or deficit serves as a measure of the
direct impact of Federal Government spending and taxa-
tion on the financial assets of the private sector of the
economy (including state and local governments). Sur-
pluses or deficits in this budget indicate changes in the
public debt and/or changes in the Treasury’s cash balance.
National trreorne -leconnts Budget
The national income accounts budget summarizes the
receipts and expenditures of the Federal Government sector
as an integrated part of the recorded activities (i.e., the
national income accounts) of all sectors of the economy.
Primary differences between the cash budget and the na-
tional income accounts budget are (1) on the expenditure
side, spending is recorded when delivery is made to the
Government, and purchases and sales of existing real and
financial assets are excluded, and (2) on the receipts side,
taxes are in large measure recorded when the tax liability
is incurred,
high —Fmplo%-nren t Bridget
The high-employment budget is an estimate of expend-
itures and revenues in the Federal sector of the national
there is a questionabout flexibility in its impact. Incom-
lete knowledge of the magnitude and timing of monetary actions on economic activity indicates that it should be used carefully as a tool of stabilization
policy.10
Uncertainty about the length and variability of time
lags in the implementation and effect of monetary and
fiscal policy suggests that stisnulus or restraint he ap- plied in moderate doses when the econosny isat high snploysnent. Large adjustments in policy variables
t0
Some evidence has recently been presented to support the
view that monetary actions may affect total desnand quite
quickly via portfolio belsavicar of Isolders of liquid assets. See
Donald P. Tucker, Dynamic Income Adjustment to Money
Supply Changes,” Amer/cuss Economic Review (June 1966),
pp. 433-449.
APPENDIX
Budget Concepts and Definitions
Page 11income accounts for a level of high employment.4 It is an
attempt to correct the distortion introduced by the impact
of the economy itself (through the effect of changing levels
of economic activity on Government expenditures and tax
receipts) on the realized surplus or deficit. The smaller
the surplus or greater the deficit in this budget, the more
stimulative is the impact of Federal fiscal activities and




Another measure of partic-
ular importance in evaluat-
ing the impact of the Federal
Government on the economy
is “new obligational author-
ity.” This is legislation by
Congress permitting a Gov-
ernment agency or depart-
ment to commit or obligate
the Government to certain ex-
penditures. Congress does rsot
vote on expenditures; it
determines new obligational
authority. Before funds can
hespent, an agency must sub-
mit and have approved by
the Bus-eau of the Budget an
apportionment request. Tlsis
determines the rate at wlsich
obligational authority can he
used. An agency usually
incurs obligations, i.e., com-
mits itself to pay out money,
after apportionment by the
Bureau of the Budget.
Incurring obligations does not necessarily mean immedi-
ate cash expenditures. When the Government buys goods
and services produced by the private sector, the lag of
expenditures belsind obligations may be substantial, In the
case of items not usually kept in inventory, like military
hardware, it usually takes time for private producers to






RECONCILIATION OF VARIOUS MEASURES







Administrative budget receipts 104.7 117.0 126.9
Plus: Trust fund receipts 34.9 44.9 48.1
Less: tntragovernmental transactions 4.5 6.2 6.5
Receipts from exercise of monetary authority .6 1.1 .5
Equals: Federal receipts from the public 134.5 154.7 168.1
Less: Cash transactions cxctuded from Federal
receipts account (District of Columbia,
financial transactiar,s, etc.) 1.3 1.8 2.0
Plus: Items added to Federal sector account
but not irs cash receipts (netting
differences, timing differences, etc.) —-. .6 — 3.1 1 0
Equals: Federal receipts, national Income accounts 132.6 149.2 167.1
Plus: Adjustmer.t for tax receipts because of
deviation of economy from high employment .3 .2 0
Equals: High-employment receipts 132.9 150.0 161.1
EXPENDITURES
Administrative budget expenditures 107.0 126.7 135.0
Plus: Trust fund expenditures 34.9 40.9 44.5
Less, lntroga,errmcntat transactions 4.5 6.2 6 5
Debt issuance in lieu of checks and
other adjustments — .4 .6 .7
Equals: Federal payments to the public 131.8 160.9 172.4
less: Cash transactions excluded from Federal
expenditures account (District of Columbia,
financial transactions. etc.) 7.3 8.7 5.0
Plus: Items added to Federal sector account but
not in cosh payments (netting differences,
timing differences. etc.) 1.8 1.5 l.a
Equals: Federal expenditures, national income accounts 132.3 153.6 169.2
Plus: Adiustmenl for expenditures because of
deviation of economy from high employment 000
Equals: High-employment expenditures 132.3 153.6 169.2
SURPLUS OR DEFICIT
Administrative budget —73 —-9.7 —8.1
Cash budget —3.3 -— 6.2 ---4.3
National income accounts budget -j - .3 —3.8 —2.1
High-employment budget H - .6 —3.6 —-2.1
Sources: The Budget of Ike United Stales Coeernmene for the Fiscal Year En.!. “c I.cc 3d - / ‘I’. isis












The President’s Council of
Economic Advisers defines a
high-employment level of eco-
nomic activity as that level
associated with a 4 per cent
unemployment rate. The high-
employment budget could be
computed for other budget
concepts, but, for an analysis
of the economic impact of the
budget, the national income
accounts basis seems most
appropriate. For a description
of techniques and procedures
for calculating high-employ-
ment budget estimates, see
Nancy H. Teeters, “Estimates
of the Full-Employment Sur-
plus, 1955-1964”, The Review
of Econorttics and Statistics,
XLVII (August 1965), pp.
309-321.
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